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COMMENT
BALLOT ACCESS BEHIND BARS
Robin Fisher*
INTRODUCTION
After Joe Watson was arrested in 2007, he spent two and a half years sitting
in a jail cell awaiting trial.1 During his incarceration, Watson paid attention
as Barack Obama campaigned in the 2008 election.2 Even though Watson
was in jail, because he was a U.S. citizen, over eighteen years old, and had
never been convicted of a felony, he maintained his right to vote.3 But, when
Watson requested a ballot from guards, they denied his request and simply
laughed. 4 “They just ignored me. There was nothing I could do,” Watson
said.5 “I was just denied my right to vote. It was very deflating.”6
Watson’s story reflects a troubling phenomenon that occurs throughout the
United States: jail policies unconstitutionally inhibit—or outright prevent—
eligible voters from participating in elections.7 Nearly all jailed citizens are
merely awaiting trial and not yet convicted of anything, or serving time for
nondisenfranchising misdemeanor crimes.8 Therefore, barring age or
immigration status restrictions, most of the U.S. jailed population is legally
eligible to vote.9 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly affirmed that
election policies violate the Equal Protection Clause if such policies: (1)
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2018, University of
California, Los Angeles. I would like to thank Professor Bruce Green for his invaluable
advice. I also want to thank my friends and family for their support, and in particular, Andrew,
for his endless help and encouragement.
1. See Hannah Critchfield, Only Eight People Voted from Arizona’s Jails in 2018. Will
This Election Be Different?, INTERCEPT (Mar. 16, 2020, 12:20 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2020/03/16/voting-rights-arizona-jails/
[https://perma.cc/W9HU2U4K].
2. Id.
3. Id.; see also ARIZ. CONST. art. 7, § 2.
4. Critchfield, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. See Thea Sebastian et al., Democracy, If You Can Afford It: How Financial
Conditions Are Undermining the Right to Vote, 4 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 79, 92 (2020).
9. Jason Asenso, Most People in Jail Can Vote. Here’s Why Many Don’t,
INJUSTICEWATCH (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.injusticewatch.org/news/2020/jailvotingreport/
[https://perma.cc/62P2-67DP]. When I refer to the jailed population in this Comment, I am
referring to the part of the jailed population who are otherwise eligible to vote.
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arbitrarily disenfranchise people in jail or (2) place an “unconstitutionally
onerous burden” on access to the franchise.10
Nonetheless, current policies within jails inhibit nearly 745,00011 votingeligible citizens from casting a ballot on Election Day.12 Notably, these
policies disproportionately impact people of color and other historically
marginalized voters.13 For example, while Black and Latinx people in the
United States comprise 30 percent of the general population, they comprise
over 50 percent of the U.S. jail population.14 Jail-based disenfranchisement
policies mirror Jim Crow-era laws—they appear facially neutral, but in
practice significantly impede voter participation of specific groups of
individuals.15 In the aftermath of Reconstruction, discrete minority groups
faced barriers to the ballot box such as poll taxes, grandfather clauses, and
poll intimidation.16 Today, a discrete group of voting-eligible individuals, a
disproportionate number of whom are poor minorities, face similar
impediments when they try to vote from jail.17
Although incarcerated voters comprise only a small portion of the U.S.
electorate, these voters can make a meaningful difference in close elections.
In 2016, former president Donald J. Trump won the 2016 presidential contest
in Michigan by 10,700 votes; there were 16,600 people detained in Michigan
jails during the election.18 Similarly, President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. won the
2020 presidential contest in Georgia by 12,670 votes;19 there were
approximately 37,456 people detained in Georgia’s jails during the

10. O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 530 (1974).
11. NICOLE D. PORTER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, VOTING IN JAILS 5 (2020),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/voting-in-jails/
[https://perma.cc/73J22UXG] (using data current as of 2017).
12. See generally Dana Paikowsky, Note, Jails as Polling Places: Living Up to the
Obligation to Enfranchise the Voters We Jail, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 829 (2019).
13. Id. at 835.
14. RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE
MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 15 (2015), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/
incarcerations-front-door-report_02.pdf [https://perma.cc9SGV-4ARZ].
15. See generally Katie R. Eyer, The New Jim Crow Is the Old Jim Crow, 128 YALE L.J.
1002 (2019) (reviewing ELIZABETH GILLESPIE MCRAE, MOTHERS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE:
WHITE WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF WHITE SUPREMACY (2018), and JEANNE THEOHARIS, A
MORE BEAUTIFUL AND TERRIBLE HISTORY: THE USES AND MISUSES OF CIVIL RIGHTS HISTORY
(2018)).
16. Id. at 1033.
17. See Ginger Jackson-Gleich & S. Todd Yeary, Eligible, but Excluded: A Guide to
Removing
the
Barriers
to
Jail
Voting,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE,
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/jail_voting.html [https://perma.cc/YFL4-E2QU] (last
visited Apr. 27, 2021) (describing barriers that individuals incarcerated in state and local jails
face when attempting to vote).
18. Shawn Mulcahy, Cuts to USPS Threaten Voting Access for Hundreds of Thousands
of
Americans
in
Jails,
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
15,
2020,
8:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/sep/15/usps-cuts-threaten-ballot-access-inmates
[https://perma.cc/SN3T-XGES].
19. November 3, 2020 General Election: Results, GA. SEC’Y OF STATE (Nov. 20, 2020,
3:37
PM),
https://results.enr.clarityelections.com/GA/105369/web.264614/#/summary
[htps://perma.cc/C2RN-UZ4L].
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election.20 If Michigan’s and Georgia’s policies did not inhibit jailed citizens
from voting, the states very well may have seen different electoral results.21
This Comment seeks to understand the policies that prevent jailed citizens
from voting. Part I examines relevant case law to determine the legal
standard regarding voting rights behind bars. Then, Part II considers whether
modern policies for voting in jails violate that standard. Finally, Part III
identifies barriers that may prevent private plaintiffs from successfully
litigating unconstitutional disenfranchisement claims and proposes action for
the Department of Justice (DOJ) to take, pursuant to existing authority, as the
most practical solution to end jail-based disenfranchisement. While jails are
notoriously opaque, the DOJ’s unparalleled authority to conduct
investigations within such facilities makes it the most effective actor to
challenge unconstitutional practices. The U.S. government derives its
legitimacy from the participation and consent—through voting—of its
citizens; it must use its authority to combat jail-based disenfranchisement.22
I. THE RIGHT TO VOTE FROM JAIL
People in jail have a right to vote, and the realities of incarceration should
not prevent jailed individuals from exercising that right. Jail-based
disenfranchisement occurs when election policies prevent constitutionally
eligible jailed citizens from voting.23
First, an important note on terminology: although “prison” and “jail” are
often used interchangeably as places of incarceration, the two words are not
synonymous. “Prisons” hold individuals convicted of serious crimes who are
generally serving sentences of one year or more.24 In contrast, “jails” house
individuals awaiting trial or serving sentences for minor crimes, generally for
less than one year.25 Only 39 percent of jail inmates are serving time for
convictions, and all of those convictions are for minor nondisenfranchising
crimes.26 The other 61 percent of jail inmates are awaiting trial and not yet
convicted of any crime.27 These pretrial detainees are often in jail because

20. VERA INST. OF JUST., INCARCERATION TRENDS IN GEORGIA 1 (2019),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/pdfdownloads/state-incarceration-trends-georgia.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q8ZT-K63H] (displaying the most recent data regarding Georgia’s jailed
population).
21. Mulcahy, supra note 18 (“Imagine the huge impact this election could have when you
have this entire class of sectioned-off citizens.”).
22. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
23. See generally Paikowski, supra note 12.
24. See Sharon Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison, 48 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 4 n.14 (2011).
25. Id.
26. JACOB KANG-BROWN & RAM SUBRAMANIAN, VERA INST. OF JUST., OUT OF SIGHT:
THE GROWTH OF JAILS IN RURAL AMERICA 10 (2017), https://www.vera.org/downloads/
publications/out-of-sight-growth-of-jails-rural-america.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L59-ZSHN].
27. Id.
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they cannot afford to pay bail28 or are on trial for a nonbailable offense.29 By
definition, the United States presumes that the majority of the jail population
is innocent, at least until proven guilty.30
It is important to note that jails generally do not house people serving time
for felony convictions, and this Article does not explore the validity of
policies that disenfranchise convicted felons. In the 1974 case Richardson v.
Ramirez,31 the Court affirmed that states have the authority to restrict voting
rights based on previous felony convictions.32 As the majority of the people
in jail are awaiting trial, not yet convicted, the Court did not express any
opinion about voting from jail.33
On three occasions the Supreme Court held that states must provide people
in jail with meaningful access to the ballot box. First, in McDonald v. Board
of Election Commissioners of Chicago,34 the Court held that otherwiseeligible people in jail are legally qualified to vote and that housing within a
jail cannot bar access to the franchise.35 Then, in Goosby v. Osser,36 the
Court affirmed that a state violates the Constitution when it prevents eligible
jailed citizens from accessing the voting franchise.37
Lastly, in O’Brien v. Skinner,38 the Court clarified the doctrinal framework
to determine whether election policies unconstitutionally disenfranchise
people in jail. In O’Brien, county officials denied petitioners’ request for:
(1) establishing a mobile voter registration unit in the jail, (2) transportation
to polling places, and (3) permission to register and vote absentee.39
Ultimately, the Court recognized that New York’s election statutes
disenfranchised its jailed citizens who were lawfully authorized to vote.40
Importantly, the Court held that a constitutional injury arises if a state makes
it facially impossible for those in jail to vote, or if its policies create the
functional equivalent of making voting impossible.41 Further, even if voting
is not necessarily impossible, a constitutional injury arises if those policies

28. See Stephanie Wykstra, Bail Reform, Which Could Save Millions of Unconvicted
People from Jail, Explained, VOX (Oct. 17, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/futureperfect/2018/10/17/17955306/bail-reform-criminal-justice-inequality
[https://perma.cc/P4SZ-9PHE].
29. See KANG-BROWN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 26, at 10. Individual states determine
what constitutes a bailable or nonbailable offense. See Shima Baradaran, Restoring the
Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 761 (2011).
30. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
31. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
32. Id. at 56.
33. Id.
34. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
35. Id. at 805.
36. 409 U.S. 512 (1973).
37. Id. at 518. However, the Court ultimately remanded the case based on a procedural
error. Id. at 522.
38. 414 U.S. 524 (1974).
39. Id. at 527.
40. Id. at 530.
41. Id.
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“operate as a restriction which is ‘so severe as itself to constitute an
unconstitutionally onerous burden on the . . . exercise of the franchise.’”42
O’Brien did not create an extensive framework to determine whether a
constitutional violation exists, and only two lower courts have found
unconstitutional disenfranchisement within jails. In Dawson v. Kendrick,43
a West Virginia district court held that jail officials “must take steps to
facilitate the [jailed plaintiffs’] right to vote as otherwise established” by state
law.44 Then, in Murphree v. Winter,45 a Mississippi district court granted a
detainee plaintiff class’s pretrial motion for a preliminary injunction and
prohibited the defendant jail officials from denying jailed voters access to an
absentee ballot.46 The court held that the deprivation of the right to vote
“outweigh[ed] any threatened harm that the injunction could do to the
Defendants.”47
II. MODERN ELECTION PRACTICES
As previously discussed, when Joe Watson attempted to vote from jail in
Arizona in 2008, guards laughed in his face.48 The sad truth is that Watson’s
story is not an aberration. Not only are people in jail unaware that they have
a right to vote, but jail policies in the United States actively inhibit—or fail
to facilitate—voting access behind bars. Specifically, local procedures often
prevent or inhibit those people from: (1) registering to vote, (2) being
informed about the candidates on Election Day, (3) voting in person, and (4)
voting by mail.49
One of the most significant barriers to voting from jail is confusion
regarding voter eligibility.50 Election officials often lack sufficient
knowledge regarding whether people in jail can vote.51 For example, in
Tennessee, 90 percent of local election officials incorrectly understood state
laws regarding voting eligibility for individuals with out-of-state felony
convictions.52 When an official, whose sole job is to administer elections, is
confused about whether jailed individuals can vote, this suggests that those
jailed individuals may be confused as to their own voting eligibility.
42. Id. at 530 (omission in original) (quoting Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 760
(1973)).
43. 527 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.W. Va. 1981).
44. Id. at 1316.
45. 589 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Miss. 1984).
46. Id. at 382.
47. Id. at 381–82.
48. See Critchfield, supra note 1.
49. Id.
50. Jackson-Gleich & Yeary, supra note 17.
51. ERIKA WOOD & RACHEL BLOOM, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION & BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST., DE FACTO DISENFRANCHISEMENT 6 (2008), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/legacy/publications/09.08.DeFacto.Disenfranchisement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9WM9-V764].
52. Id. Although this statistic refers to felons, the statistic suggests that county officials
fail to understand voting qualifications for U.S. citizens involved in the criminal justice
system. See id.
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This uncertainty regarding the voting eligibility of people in jail, coupled
with the fear of penalties for voting improperly, can encourage people in jail
to err on the side of caution and refrain from voting. When Christian Nasse
attempted to vote from his Arizona jail cell in 2020, an officer warned him
that he could face punishments for voting improperly.53 Nasse did not know
if he was voting-eligible.54 He could not search the internet or ask a poll
worker to determine his eligibility. Rather, he had to take a chance: (1) either
abstain from voting, or (2) cast a vote with no way to determine whether he
was voting-eligible. If he abstained, he faced no legal penalties. If he voted
and was not eligible, he could be criminally punished and sentenced to
prison.55 Nasse refrained from voting for fear of legal repercussions.56
Ultimately, he was eligible to vote and would have faced no legal penalties
for voting from jail.57
Even if people in jail know that they are voting-eligible, practical election
processes also inhibit voting access.58 Sheriffs acting in bad faith refuse to
give jailed citizens voting information in a timely fashion, prevent third
parties from providing registration documents, and retaliate against people in
jail who express interest in registering to vote.59 In 2020, the Arizona
Coalition to End Jail-Based Disenfranchisement (the “Coalition”) mailed
postcards to people detained in Arizona’s Apache County Jail.60 These
postcards stated, “BEING IN JAIL DOES NOT AFFECT YOUR RIGHT
TO VOTE,” and they offered information regarding the process for jail-based
voting.61 The Coalition carefully ensured that the postcards complied with
the jail’s mail regulations.62 Days after the jailed citizens received the
postcards, a guard demanded that the postcards be returned because the jail
could not “ensure that the cards d[id] not contain contraband without

53. See Madeleine Carlisle & Lissandra Villa, Whether or Not You’re Able to Vote in Jail
May Come Down to Where You’re Incarcerated, TIME (Oct. 1, 2020, 8:19 PM),
https://time.com/5895219/voting-jail-2020-election/ [https://perma.cc/NZZ5-9CH].
54. See id.
55. In Arizona, a person who has a felony conviction does not legally have the right to
vote. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-904 (2021). Further, a person who knowingly votes in
Arizona, despite not being voting-eligible, is guilty of a class 5 felony. See id. § 16-1016.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. While there is little publicly available information regarding jail voting policies and
practices, third-party interest groups have made such data available in Arizona. See generally,
ARIZ. COAL. TO END JAIL-BASED DISENFRANCHISEMENT, UNLOCK THE VOTE ARIZONA:
PROCEDURES FOR JAIL-BASED VOTING BY COUNTY JULY 2020 (2020),
https://foundation.azadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/July_JBV_Report_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8K2U-XVPN]. This Part focuses on that available data.
59. See Carlisle & Villa, supra note 53.
60. Letter from The Ariz. Coal. to End Jail-Based Disenfranchisement et al. to Joseph
Dedman, Sheriff, Apache Cnty. & Michael Cirivello, Commander, Apache Cnty. Jail 2 (Sept.
25, 2020), https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/
FINAL_Apache%20County%20Jail%20Voting%20Letter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4SLLUPYC] [hereinafter Letter to Dedman].
61. See Carlisle & Villa, supra note 53.
62. Id.
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destroying the postcard.”63 It is unclear how a postcard that complied with
the jail’s mailing regulations could contain contraband. Because the officers
re-collected the postcards in a matter of days, no people in the Apache
County Jail registered to vote.64
People in jail likewise have limited access to materials required to vote.
Election regulations often require that voters, especially first-time voters,
provide a social security or driver’s license number before registering to
vote.65 Many states have voter identification laws that require particular
forms of identification to register and vote.66 Jails confiscate personal items
after arrest, so eligible voters in jail may not have the required types of
identification.67
The few jailed citizens who successfully register to vote regularly have no
way of researching who or what they are voting for and cannot make
informed decisions on Election Day.68 Jails severely restrict access to
television, newspapers, and the media.69 A jail inmate who receives a ballot
but has no way to research the candidates or initiatives cannot make an
informed decision. Although some third parties provide nonpartisan guides
regarding elections, the sheriff decides whether to distribute those guides.70
For example, in the 2020 Arizona primary election, although the Coalition
provided the Apache County Jail with free, neutral pamphlets regarding the
election, the guards did not deliver the information to the jailed citizens, who
felt uninformed and lacked access to sufficient information regarding the
election.71
Jail practices also inhibit people from voting by mail. Take, for example,
what happened when Yonas Kahsai attempted to vote from jail in 2018.72
Unlike many voting-eligible jailed inmates, Kahsai, a former union organizer
heavily involved in voter registration efforts, knew he was eligible to vote
and requested an absentee ballot from his cell.73 A guard promptly, and
incorrectly, stated that Kahsai could not have one.74 Nevertheless, Kahsai
persisted, and the guard eventually granted his request.75 Although the ballot
arrived at the jail, Kahsai never received it because it was enclosed in a
government-issued envelope so large that it violated the jail’s mail
restrictions.76 The government’s own failure to comply with the jail’s mail
63. Id. (quoting Apache County Jail Commander Michael Cirivello).
64. Id.
65. Jackson-Gleich & Yeary, supra note 17.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Letter to Dedman, supra note 60, at 2 (“[V]oters in the jail reported not having
adequate information with which they could vote.”).
69. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 526 (2006).
70. See Letter to Dedman, supra note 60, at 2.
71. Id.
72. See Critchfield, supra note 1.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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restrictions prevented Kahsai, an eligible voter, from participating in the
democratic process.77
Likewise, because guards often screen all incoming and outgoing mail,
jailed inmates may fear that this screening will compromise their ballot
secrecy.78 In Contra Costa County, California, for example, jail staff may
read all nonprivileged outgoing mail.79 As evidentiary privilege does not
protect ballots, jail staff can feasibly examine a jailed inmate’s voting
record.80 Also, sheriffs—who oversee the jails—run in local elections, so
fears of compromised ballot secrecy may produce concerns about
retaliation.81 When a person in jail knows that jail officials may likely see
who the person voted for, that person is incentivized not to vote at all.
Importantly, political pressure often incentivizes sheriffs to enact policies
that result in jail-based disenfranchisement.
Many states delegate
tremendous decision-making authority to local sheriffs to determine whether
detained voters can access the franchise.82 These sheriffs, who are often
running for election themselves, determine whether to make voting materials
accessible—or inaccessible—to voting-eligible detainees.83 In one instance
in Arizona, the sheriff refused to institute policies that would facilitate voting
within county jails, even after the county recorder approved the policies.84
Democratic Sheriff Paul Penzone, who refused to institute suggested
changes, was up for reelection in a Republican district and responsible for
facilitating jailed citizen voting during the election.85 Political pollster Paul
Bentz hypothesized that part of the reason why the sheriff did not facilitate
jail-based voting was because it would not appeal to the Republican voter
base in the district.86 This system permits, and at times incentivizes, thirdparty interference with jail-based voting. Only seven people in jail voted in
the March 2020 primary election in Arizona, even though an estimated 2700
people in jail were eligible to vote.87 This represents a 0.26 percent rate of
participation, which is 187 times less than the overall turnout rate for the
election.88

77. Id.
78. Jackson-Gleich & Yeary, supra note 17.
79. See Send Mail to an Inmate, CONTRA COSTA CNTY. OFF. OF THE SHERIFF,
https://www.cocosheriff.org/bureaus/custody-services/send-mail-to-an-inmate
[https://perma.cc/AY24-BWZS] (last visited Apr. 27, 2021) (select “Incoming Inmate Mail”
and “Outgoing Inmate Mail”).
80. Jackson-Gleich & Yeary, supra note 17.
81. Id.
82. Kira Lerner, Sheriffs Have A Lot of Power over Whether Hundreds of Thousands of
People Can Vote, THE APPEAL (Aug. 10, 2020), https://theappeal.org/politicalreport/sheriffsand-voting-rights-in-jail/ [https://perma.cc/5FM3-RV3A].
83. See id.
84. See Critchfield, supra note 1.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. ARIZ. COAL. TO END JAIL-BASED DISENFRANCHISEMENT, supra note 58, at 4.
88. Id.
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III. VINDICATING VOTING RIGHTS
Although the causes may vary, the result is clear: many of the people in
U.S. jails cannot vote. Despite the vague framework, it appears that some
jail-based election policies today might be unconstitutional. Unlike in
O’Brien, people in jail today are facially allowed to vote by mail in every
state.89 However, like in O’Brien, many people in jail may face an “onerous
burden” when attempting to access the franchise.90 As previously discussed,
people in jail often do not know that they can vote, and voting improperly
may result in criminal penalties that may encourage people in jail to err on
the side of caution and abstain from casting a ballot.91 Jail officials may
refuse to distribute election-related information, people in jail often cannot
research candidates to make an informed decision, mail policies may prevent
jailed inmates from receiving their ballots, and screening policies and
threatening guards may intimidate voters.92
It is unclear what exactly constitutes an onerous burden under the current
judicial framework. However, it is clear that many people in jail do not
vote.93 Individually, not all modern voting practices may rise to the level of
a constitutional injury. Failure to educate jail-based voters, for example, by
itself may not violate the Constitution because it may not constitute an
“onerous burden.” But a combination of the aforementioned policies may be
unconstitutional if people in jail have no meaningful way to vote.
Additionally, an onerous burden may arise if guards take affirmative actions
to prevent people in jail from voting, as when a guard threatened Christian
Nasse with criminal punishments or when guards laughed in Joe Watson’s
face and incorrectly told him that he could not vote.94 Likewise, jail policies
or practices may violate the Constitution when they actively prevent jailed
citizens from accessing election-related information or prevent third parties
from communicating such information.
Determining whether a constitutional injury exists requires a fact-specific
analysis to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, people
in a specific jail cannot access the franchise.95 This requires detailed
investigations within individual jails. Such investigations are difficult to
accomplish because interested parties must collect nonpublic jail data.96 As
in O’Brien, many people in jail are “not disabled from voting except by
reason of not being able physically—in the very literal sense—to go to the
polls on election day or to make the appropriate registration in advance by
mail.”97
89. See Asenso, supra note 9.
90. O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 530 (1974).
91. See supra notes 53–57.
92. See supra Part II.
93. See Critchfield, supra note 1.
94. See id.; see also Carlisle & Villa, supra note 53.
95. O’Brien, 414 U.S. at 528.
96. See Sarah Geraghty & Melanie Velez, Bringing Transparency and Accountability to
Criminal Justice Institutions in the South, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 455, 456 (2011).
97. O’Brien, 414 U.S. at 528.
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Private Plaintiffs Face Significant Impediments to Successful
Litigation

As previously discussed, many modern policies likely fail to provide
people in jail with meaningful access to the franchise and potentially violate
the Constitution. Yet, even if jailed citizens have meritorious claims that
election policies violate the Constitution, numerous barriers prevent private
plaintiffs from successfully challenging such policies in court.
One problem exists because actions contesting jail-based
disenfranchisement generally must be brought by people in jail themselves.98
But, those jailed inmates—who have standing—often lack resources required
for successful litigation. For example, jailed individuals often do not possess
the funds required to finance the enormous cost of litigating systemic,
institutional abuses.99 A majority of the 555,000 pretrial detainees are in jail
because they cannot post bail.100 Based on the most recently available data,
the median amount of money bail in the United States is $10,000.101 It is
unlikely that a jailed citizen, who is unable to post a $10,000 bail, could
afford an attorney and litigate jail policies that prevent jailed citizens from
voting. Jailed inmates may litigate on their own, but these claims are
procedurally quite difficult: two of the three jail-based disenfranchisement
cases that reached the Supreme Court were decided on procedural
grounds.102 While some people in jail have tried litigating these claims pro
se, lower courts have often dismissed such claims based on procedural
errors.103
Also, people in jail, who are wholly reliant on institutions that house them,
are deterred from pursuing such litigation for fear of retaliation.104 Guard
intimidation and fear may dissuade people in jail from litigating against the
jail in which they reside.105 Individuals in jail are careful not to upset the
guards, on whom they rely for food and all of life’s necessities.106 Therefore,
98. See generally Alex Beck, Note, “Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Collect $200, Do Not
Submit Your Absentee Ballot, Go Directly to Jail, and Lose Your Right to Vote”: Why
Traditional Standing Tests Insulate Voting-Rights Claims, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 529 (2017).
99. See S. REP. NO. 96-416, at 20 (1979); see also Paikowski, supra note 12, at 836–37.
100. Tara O’Neill Hayes & Margaret Barnhorst, Incarceration and Poverty in the United
States, AM. ACTION F. (June 30, 2020), https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/
incarceration-and-poverty-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/SQ5Q-4H7E].
101. BERNADETTE RABUY & DANIEL KOPF, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, DETAINING THE
POOR: HOW MONEY BAIL PERPETUATES AN ENDLESS CYCLE OF POVERTY AND JAIL TIME 14 n.9
(2016) (“The only national data we are aware of is for felony defendants in 2009, which found
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102. See generally Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973) (finding that the district court
failed to convene a three-judge panel as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2284); McDonald v. Bd.
of Election Comm’rs of Chi., 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (finding that the record failed to indicate
sufficient facts establishing a constitutional violation and implying that the plaintiffs
improperly pled their case).
103. See, e.g., Long v. Pierce, No. 14-cv-00244, 2016 WL 912685, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Mar.
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it is unlikely that a person in jail would take on the huge expense—monetary
and otherwise—of litigating jail-based disenfranchisement.107 Based on
these reasons, without any assistance, jailed individuals cannot be expected
to seek redress for the systemic deprivation of their basic right to vote.
Third-party interest groups may attempt to challenge jail-based
disenfranchisement, but such groups also face significant barriers to judicial
relief. Because people in jail are statutorily allowed to vote absentee in all
fifty states,108 third parties must challenge the disenfranchising practices, not
disenfranchising laws.
This requires intensive fact-finding and
investigations. However, jails are notoriously closed off, have little
governmental oversight, and lack transparency.109 Third-party interest
groups do not have the authority to go into jails, interview detainees, and
conduct investigations.110 Even more, jail guards determine with whom
people in jail can communicate. When guards prevent third-party
organizations from informing detainees that they have the right to vote, how
will those guards respond when those organizations try to obtain information
to challenge unconstitutional disenfranchisement?
Private third-party plaintiffs lack the authority to conduct detailed
investigations regarding whether jail policies actually disenfranchise people
in jail. This capability is crucial to successfully challenge jail-based
disenfranchisement. These private third parties likely do not have sufficient
information to plausibly allege that a jail is violating the Constitution—not
because the information does not exist, but because they have no way of
accessing it.
B.

The Department of Justice Has the Authority and the Responsibility to
Challenge Jail-Based Disenfranchisement

Procedural barriers may hinder successful private litigation, but that does
not mean that state and local policies can continue to unconstitutionally deny
people in jail the right to vote. The federal government has the authority—
and responsibility—to combat jail-based disenfranchisement. Although the
federal government generally does not have jurisdiction within state and local
jails,111 in 1980 Congress enacted the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act112 (CRIPA) and codified the U.S. attorney general’s authority to
initiate legal action and correct severe patterns of abuse within U.S.
107. See id.
108. See Kate Rabinowitz & Brittany Renee Mayes, At Least 84% of American Voters Can
Cast Ballots by Mail in the Fall, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2020),
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[https://perma.cc/K36G-EBDJ].
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IN 2018, at 10 (2020), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji18.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WP4LUQP] (“A jail jurisdiction is a county (parish in Louisiana) or municipal government that
administers one or more local jails and represents the entity responsible for managing jail
facilities under its authority.”).
112. Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 352 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997).
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institutions.113 CRIPA’s purpose was to “ensure[] that institutionalized
citizens will be afforded the full measure of protections guaranteed them by
the Constitution of the United States.”114 CRIPA explicitly includes jails and
pretrial detention facilities within its scope.115
The DOJ Civil Rights Division’s Special Litigation Section (the
“Division”) is responsible for CRIPA enforcement.116 The Division can
investigate “egregious or flagrant conditions which deprive
[institutionalized] persons of any rights . . . secured or protected by the
Constitution.”117 If the Division determines that a “pattern or practice” of
constitutional violations exists at an identified jail or pretrial detention
facility, the Division must send a letter of its findings to the facility
specifying the minimal remedies that the facility must undertake to correct
the deficient conditions.118 The DOJ can negotiate with the facility regarding
improving the deficient conditions, and often the parties may reach a
settlement agreement.119 If the facility refuses or fails to correct
unconstitutional conditions, the DOJ can initiate a lawsuit to challenge those
conditions in federal court.120
DOJ action is the most effective option to combat jail-based
disenfranchisement. No other party has the authority to conduct meaningful
investigations within such facilities. Because jail-based disenfranchisement
cases are extremely fact-intensive, these investigations are fundamental to
determine whether a constitutional injury exists. After these investigations
are complete, the DOJ has real bargaining power and can engage in
meaningful negotiations with underperforming facilities to institute
significant changes. Importantly, rather than litigation itself, it is the DOJ’s
authority, coupled with the threat of litigation, that often compels jails to
correct unconstitutional behaviors.121 But if all else fails, the DOJ can use
the information from its investigations and initiate a lawsuit.122 If the DOJ
does initiate a lawsuit, it may expect “that the agency will settle the case
through a consent decree or through a settlement agreement.”123 No other
party has comparable authority to correct unconstitutional deprivations
within U.S. jails.
From 2000 to 2014, the DOJ completed 441 various CRIPA actions,
including 50 investigations, regarding jails.124 Based on these actions, the
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most common CRIPA violations include administrative issues, inadequate
mental health programs, excessive use of force, and failure to protect.125
Clearly, the attorney general has used its CRIPA authority and obtained relief
for claims of unconstitutional jail conditions. But such authority has never
been used to challenge jail-based disenfranchisement.126
CRIPA empowers the attorney general to investigate all unconstitutional
deprivations.127 Jail election policies constitute “egregious” and “flagrant”
conditions in a severe pattern of abuse by unconstitutionally inhibiting
citizens from voting solely because those individuals reside in jails.128 The
Division should use its authority to conduct investigations and, depending on
its findings, negotiate with deficient facilities or initiate lawsuits in federal
court. This solution has never been proposed before, but it may be a possible
solution to combat jail-based disenfranchisement.
The United States has a long legacy of voter suppression, particularly with
regard to people of color. Since the Reconstruction Era, federal government
intervention has been the primary driver of expanding the voting franchise,
including significant involvement behind the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, TwentyFourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Despite efforts to expand the democratic process, state and local practices
today continue to unconstitutionally disenfranchise large swaths of people.
The federal government must use its authority to prohibit practices that result
in unconstitutional disenfranchisement, particularly disenfranchisement that
targets historically marginalized communities.
CONCLUSION
“A citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor no less so because he lives in
the city or on the farm.”129 A jailed citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor
no less so because he lives in a cell. A state cannot inhibit a would-be voter
from casting a ballot merely because that voter is incarcerated in jail. States
must provide reasonable access to the franchise for these voters, but many
states have failed to do so. This is unacceptable, and the process cannot
continue.
Private litigation may not work to end jail-based
disenfranchisement, but DOJ action, pursuant to CRIPA, is the most effective
solution to challenge these unconstitutional practices and eliminate an aspect
of structural racism within the criminal justice system.
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